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This paper studies defense policies in a global-game model of speculative currency attacks.
Although the signaling role of policy interventions sustains multiple equilibria, a number of novel
predictions emerge which are robust across all equilibria. (i) The central bank intervenes by
raising domestic interest rates, or otherwise raising the cost of speculation, only when the value
it assigns to defending the peg—its “type”—is intermediate. (ii) Devaluation occurs only for low
types. (iii) The set of types who intervene shrinks with the precision of market information. (iv)
A unique equilibrium policy survives in the limit as the noise in market information vanishes,
whereas the devaluation outcome remains indeterminate. (v) The payoﬀ of the central bank is
monotonic in its type. (vi) The option to intervene can be harmful only for suﬃciently strong
types; and when this happens, weak types are necessarily better oﬀ. While these predictions
seem reasonable, none of them would have been possible in the common-knowledge version of
the model. Combined, these results illustrate the broader methodological point of the paper:
global games can retain signiﬁcant selection power and deliver useful predictions even when the
endogeneity of information sustains multiple equilibria.
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This paper investigates the properties of defense policies against speculative currency attacks: think
of a central bank trying to prevent a run against the domestic currency by raising domestic interest
rates, imposing a tax on capital outﬂows, or otherwise increasing the cost of speculation. The
exercise is conducted within a global game that stylizes the role of coordination under incomplete
information. Previous work has shown that the signaling role of policy interventions can lead
to multiple equilibria (Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan, 2006). Here we seek to understand what
predictions, if any, one can deliver regarding policy choices and devaluation outcomes that do not
rely on arbitrary equilibrium selections.
Understanding this point is important not only for the speciﬁc application under examina-
tion but also from a broader methodological perspective. The approach followed in most recent
applications of global games is to assume certain exogenous information structures as a selection
device—as a tool for achieving the convenience of unique-equilibrium comparative statics in models
that were previously ridden with multiple equilibria. For certain questions, however, understand-
ing the sources of information is the key to understanding the phenomenon under examination.
Endogenizing the sources of information often brings back multiple equilibria. What we show here
is that this multiplicity does not preclude concrete and testable predictions and is very diﬀerent
from the one that emerges under complete information.
The model features a large number of speculators deciding whether or not to attack the peg.
Devaluation takes place if and only if the aggregate attack is suﬃciently large. Speculators have
heterogenous information about the critical size of attack that triggers devaluation. Before spec-
ulators move, the central bank takes a costly action in an attempt to reduce the probability of
devaluation. Such interventions convey information about the critical size of attack that the bank
is willing, or able, to withstand. The “fundamentals” in this game thus coincide with the “type”
of the policy maker.
The ﬁrst part of the paper provides a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium out-
comes. The multiplicity of equilibria follows from previous work. The challenge here is to provide
an exhaustive characterization of all possible equilibrium outcomes—this is essential if one wishes
to identify predictions that are not sensitive to equilibrium selection.
The result is achieved through a procedure of iterated deletion of strategies that cannot be part
1of an equilibrium. This procedure is diﬀerent from the one used in standard global games, because
of the introduction of signaling. First, beliefs about payoﬀs in the coordination game played among
the speculators (the receivers) are endogenous; they are a function of the strategy of the policy
maker (the sender). Second, iterated deletion of strategies that cannot be part of an equilibrium
imposes restrictions not only on coordination among the receivers but also on the information sent
by the sender.
The second part of the paper then uses this characterization result to identify the following
predictions about policy and devaluation outcomes that are robust in the sense that they hold true
across all possible equilibria.
• The policy choice is non-monotonic in the type of the policy maker: only intermediate types
raise the policy above the cost-minimizing level in order to avoid an attack. Intervention thus
signals that the fundamentals are neither too weak nor too strong.
• The devaluation outcome, on the other hand, is monotonic in the policy maker’s type: the
peg is abandoned if and only if the fundamentals are suﬃciently weak.
• Diﬀerent equilibria can be indexed by the level of policy intervention necessary for preempting
an attack, which can be interpreted as an index of the “aggressiveness of market expectations:”
the higher this level, the larger the set of types that abandon the peg. For given aggressiveness,
an increase in the precision of the speculators’ information does not aﬀect the set of types
that maintain the peg but reduces the set of types that do so by raising the policy. In this
sense, the quality of information does not aﬀect the probability of devaluation, but reduces
the need for policy intervention.
• As the noise in information vanishes, the set of types who intervene also vanishes. By impli-
cation, the equilibrium policy is essentially unique in the limit. Nevertheless, the devaluation
outcome remains indeterminate for a non-vanishing set of types.
• The payoﬀ of the policy maker is monotonic in his type.
• The option to intervene can be harmful only for suﬃciently strong types. However, in any
equilibrium in which some strong type is worse oﬀ, some weak type is necessarily better oﬀ.
Hence, although the option to intervene leads to multiple equilibria, either the policy maker
is better oﬀ no matter his type, or low types are better oﬀ at the expense of high types.
2These predictions can be useful both for a policy maker and for an econometrician. For the policy
maker, while the multiplicity result warns him that he may not have full control over the devaluation
outcome, the aforementioned predictions give him a better understanding of how changes in the
environment—e.g., reforms that improve the fundamentals or reduce the cost of intervention—aﬀect
the set of possible outcomes in the event of a crisis. For the econometrician, the aforementioned
predictions provide empirical restrictions that can help him estimate and test the model.1
Given the structure of the underlying environment, the aforementioned predictions seem rea-
sonable. However, none of these predictions is shared by the complete-information version of the
model. Under complete information, the devaluation outcome need not be monotonic in the type
of the policy maker; intervention can occur for any arbitrary subset of the critical region (i.e., the
region of fundamentals for which the peg is maintained if no speculator attacks but is abandoned
if all speculators attack); the payoﬀ of the policy maker need not be monotonic in his type; and
the value of the option to intervene can be negative for all types in the critical region.
This observation highlights the key role that incomplete information plays in our model: even
though it does not pin down a unique equilibrium, incomplete information puts signiﬁcant restric-
tions on the mapping from primitives to outcomes, leading to predictions that otherwise would not
have been possible. This is best illustrated in the limit as the noise in the speculators’ information
vanishes: even though multiplicity obtains for any level of noise, the limit of the set of incomplete-
information outcomes is a zero-measure subset of the set of common-knowledge outcomes.
Combined, these results contain the methodological message of the paper. The game we consider
here is an example of a global game with endogenous information and multiple equilibria. If the
equilibrium outcomes obtained in this game were similar to those under common knowledge, then
for practical purposes one could largely ignore both the endogeneity and the incompleteness of
information, and go back to the earlier models that assumed common knowledge. What our results
illustrate is that global games can retain a signiﬁcant selection power even when the endogeneity
of information sustains multiple equilibria.
Related literature. The global-games approach to equilibrium selection was pioneered by
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and was recently extended by Morris and Shin (2003) and Frankel,
1The aforementioned predictions have been stated as if the econometrician knows which equilibrium is played.
Nevertheless, because they are shared by all equilibria, these predictions remain true even when the econometrician
is uncertain about which equilibrium is played. We show this by allowing for an arbitrary random selection over all
equilibria and examining the implied distribution of equilibrium outcomes.
3Morris and Pauzner (2003). By now they have been used in a variety of applications, including
currency crises (Morris and Shin, 1998; Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin, 2004; Guimaraes
and Morris, 2006), bank runs (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), debt crises
(Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini, 2006, Zwart, 2007), investment spillovers (Chamley, 1999; Das-
gupta 2006), and liquidity crashes (Morris and Shin, 2004). Our approach diﬀerentiates from this
literature in two respects. First, we see information as an integral part of the phenomenon under
examination rather than a selection device; in this respect, we view the multiplicity that originates
in the signaling role of policy as an important prediction by itself. Second, we show that global
games can deliver useful predictions even when they fail to deliver uniqueness.2
The paper also departs from several strands of the literature that study the role of policy
in crises. In common-knowledge coordination models of crises, policy analysis is by and large
restricted to identifying policies that could make certain actions dominant for the market, thus
removing the “bad” equilibrium and ensuring that a coordination failure never materializes (e.g.
Cooper and John, 1988; Zettelmeyer, 2000; Jeanne and Wyplosz, 2001). More recently, Morris
and Shin (2006b) and Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) use a global game to study how
IMF interventions can, on the one hand, have a catalytic eﬀect on crises and, on the other hand,
exacerbate the moral-hazard problem for the governments of the countries in risk of a crisis. These
papers, however, abstract completely from the signaling eﬀects that are at the heart of our approach.
Zwart (2007) examines a model in which IMF interventions convey information but in which the
policy is uniquely determined because the IMF’s incentive to intervene depend only on the country’s
fundamentals and not on the size of the attack in case of no intervention. Finally, Drazen (2000)
and Drazen and Hubrich (2005) discuss signaling eﬀects of policy interventions in currency crises
but model the market as a single large player, thus completely abstracting from the coordination
element of crises that is at the core of our analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the set of equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 identiﬁes predictions about policy and
devaluation outcomes, while Section 5 identiﬁes predictions about payoﬀs. Section 6 contrasts the
multiplicity of the incomplete-information game with that of its common-knowledge counterpart.
Section 7 concludes. All proofs omitted in the main text are in the Appendix.
2Somewhat related to this point is Chassang (2007). He ﬁnds that global games may retain signiﬁcant selection
power in a dynamic setting with exit even if they do not lead to uniqueness. Note, however, that in his model
multiplicity is due to repeated play, not due to the endogeneity of information.
42 Model
The economy is populated by a policy maker and a measure-one continuum of speculators, indexed
by i and uniformly distributed over [0,1]. Each speculator can choose between two actions, either
“attack” the peg (i.e., short-sell the domestic currency) or abstain from attacking. The policy
maker has some privately-known value for maintaining the peg and controls a policy instrument
that aﬀects the speculators’ opportunity cost of attacking.
Let θ denote the policy maker’s type (his willingness to defend the peg, or his “strength”), r ∈
[r, ¯ r] ⊂ (0,1) the policy instrument (the speculators’ opportunity cost of attacking) and D ∈ {0,1}
the devaluation outcome, with D = 0 when the peg is maintained and D = 1 otherwise.
The game evolves through three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the policy maker learns his type θ
and sets the policy r. In the second stage, speculators decide simultaneously whether or not to
attack, after observing the policy r, and after receiving private signals xi = θ + σξi about θ; the
scalar σ ∈ (0,∞) parameterizes the quality of the speculators’ information, while ξi is noise, i.i.d.
across speculators and independent of θ, with a continuous log-concave probability density function
ψ strictly positive over the entire real line. The common prior about θ is assumed to be uniform
over the interval [−M,+M], for some M > 0; as it is standard in the literature, to simplify the
analysis we consider the limit case where M = +∞. In the third and ﬁnal stage, the policy maker
decides whether or not to maintain the peg after observing the mass of speculators who decided to
attack.
The payoﬀ for a speculator who does not attack is normalized to zero, whereas the payoﬀ from
attacking is 1 − r if the peg is abandoned and −r otherwise. The policy instrument r can thus
be interpreted as the interest rate diﬀerential between domestic and foreign bonds or as a tax on
capital outﬂows.
The payoﬀ for the policy maker, on the other hand, has two components: the gross value of
maintaining the peg, and the cost of policy intervention. The cost of setting the policy at r is
C (r), where C is continuously increasing, with C (r) = 0. The gross value of maintaining the peg
is V (θ,A), where A ∈ [0,1] is the mass of speculators attacking; V is twice diﬀerentiable, with
Vθ > 0 > VA, V (θ,0) = V (¯ θ,1) = 0 for some θ < ¯ θ, VθA ≥ 0, and limθ→∞[V (θ,0) − V (θ,1)] = 0.3
The policy maker’s net payoﬀ is thus V (θ,A)−C(r) if the peg is maintained and −C(r) otherwise.
3Vθ and VA denote the partial derivatives of V with respect to θ and A; VθA denotes the cross derivative.
5Remark. The assumptions that the value of maintaining the peg, V , is increasing in θ and
decreasing in A, and that there exist θ and ¯ θ such that V (θ,0) = V (¯ θ,1) = 0 permit us to partition
the policy maker’s type space in three regions: for θ < θ the peg is abandoned even if no speculator
attacks; for θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] the peg is sound but vulnerable to a suﬃciently large attack; and for θ > ¯ θ
the peg survives even if everybody attacks. The interval [θ, ¯ θ] thus identiﬁes the “critical region”
where multiple equilibria exist under common knowledge—a “good” equilibrium in which nobody
attacks, along with a “bad” equilibrium in which everybody attacks.
The assumptions that VθA ≥ 0 and limθ→∞[V (θ,0) − V (θ,1)] = 0 mean that the beneﬁt of
avoiding an attack (or of reducing its size) is higher for weaker types, and eventually vanishes as
θ → ∞. This last property guarantees that intervention is unnecessary for extremely high types.
Finally, the assumption that the policy maker’s payoﬀ in the event of devaluation is independent
of the size of the attack reﬂects the fact that the main costs of defending a peg, such as the cost of
borrowing reserves from abroad, are costs that are not incurred if the peg is abandoned—see also
Drazen (2000) for a discussion.
Equilibrium. We consider perfect Bayesian equilibria. Let r(θ) denote the policy chosen by
type θ, a(x,r) the action of a speculator who receives a private signal x and who observes a policy
r, A(θ,r) the aggregate size of attack, and D(θ,r,A) the decision of whether to abandon the peg.
Next, let µ(θ|x,r) denote the cumulative distribution function of an speculator’s posterior belief
about θ, conditional on x and r. Finally, let U(θ,r,A) ≡ maxD∈{0,1}{(1−D)V (θ,A)−C (r)}. The
equilibrium deﬁnition can then be stated as follows.
Deﬁnition. A (symmetric pure-strategy) equilibrium consists of a policy function r(θ), a strategy
for the speculators a(x,r), a rule for devaluation D(θ,r,A) and a cumulative distribution function
µ(θ|x,r), such that
r(θ) ∈ arg max
r∈[r,¯ r]
U(θ,r,A(θ,r)) ∀θ (1)




D(θ,r,A(θ,r))dµ(θ|x,r) − r] ∀(x,r) (2)
D(θ,r,A) ∈ arg max
D∈{0,1}
{(1 − D)V (θ,A) − C (r)} ∀(θ,r,A) (3)
µ(θ|x,r) is obtained from Bayes’ rule using r( ) for any x ∈ R and any r ∈ r(R), (4)
6where A(θ,r) ≡
  +∞
−∞ a(x,r)σ−1ψ ((x − θ)/σ)dx is the equilibrium size of attack and r(R) ≡ {r :
r = r(θ), θ ∈ R} is the set of policy interventions that are played in equilibrium. The equilibrium
devaluation outcome is D(θ) ≡ D(θ,r(θ),A(θ,r(θ)).
Conditions (1), (2) and (3) require that the policy maker’s and the speculators’ actions be
sequentially rational, while condition (4) requires that, on the equilibrium path, the speculators’
beliefs be pinned down by Bayes’ rule.4
3 Equilibrium characterization
In this section we provide a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes. Let E(σ)
denote the set of all possible equilibria in the game with noise σ. Next, let E(s;σ) denote the set of
equilibria in which the range of the policy is r(R) = {r,s} for some s ≥ r.





that the following are true for any σ > 0:
(i) E (σ) = ∪s∈[r,˜ r]E (s;σ), with E (s;σ)  = ∅ for all s ∈ [r, ˜ r].
(ii) Any equilibrium in E (r;σ) is such that




1 for θ < ˜ θ
0 for θ > ˜ θ
(iii) For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r], there exist unique thresholds θ∗ ∈ (θ, ˜ θ] and θ∗∗ ≥ θ∗ such that any





r∗ for θ ∈ (θ∗,θ∗∗)





1 for θ < θ∗
0 for θ > θ∗
As mentioned in the Introduction, the challenge here is not to prove the existence of equilibria
that satisfy the conditions in parts (ii) and (iii), but rather to show that all equilibria must satisfy
these properties. In the rest of the section, we prove this result through a series of lemmas. Lemmas
1 to 6 iteratively eliminate strategy proﬁles that can not be part of an equilibrium, thus identifying
4The deﬁnition restricts attention to symmetric pure-strategy equilibria; as discussed after Proposition 1 this is
without loss of generality.
7a set of necessary conditions for equilibrium strategies. Lemma 7 completes the characterization
by showing that these conditions are also suﬃcient. The reader interested only in how Proposition
1 translates into concrete testable predictions can jump to Section 4.
First, consider the set of equilibria in which all types pool on r.




such that any equilibrium in E (r;σ) is
such that a(x,r) = 1 if x < ˜ x, a(x,r) = 0 if x > ˜ x, D(θ) = 1 if θ < ˜ θ and D(θ) = 0 if θ > ˜ θ.
(ii) The thresholds ˜ θ and ˜ x are the unique solutions to V (˜ θ,1 − r) = 0 and 1 − Ψ( ˜ x−˜ θ
σ ) = r.
Proof. Consider the continuation game that follows r. Because the observation of r conveys no
information, this game is identical to a standard global game (e.g. Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003),
which proves the existence of a unique continuation equilibrium, as stated in Part (i). For part (ii),
note that a speculator who expects devaluation to occur if and only if θ < ˜ θ must be indiﬀerent







Similarly, a policy maker who faces an attack of size A(θ,r) = Ψ((˜ x − θ)/σ) must be indiﬀerent









Finally, substituting (5) into (6) gives V (˜ θ,1 − r) = 0.
Next, consider equilibria in which some type raises the policy above r. For any θ, let ρ(θ) denote
the maximal policy that is not strictly dominated for θ : ρ(θ) = r for θ < θ, ρ(θ) = C−1(V (θ,0))
for θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ], and ρ(θ) = C−1(V (θ,0) − V (θ,1)) for θ > ¯ θ.5 Clearly in any equilibrium, the policy
must satisfy r(θ) ≤ ρ(θ) for all θ.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium in which some type intervenes, there exists a single r∗ ∈ (r,ρ(¯ θ)]
such that r(θ) = r∗ whenever r(θ)  = r.
5To simplify notation, we assume that ρ
 ¯ θ
 
< ¯ r. When this is not the case, all the results hold by replacing ρ(θ)
with ˆ ρ(θ) ≡ min{ρ(θ), ¯ r}.
8Proof. Because the policy maker faces no uncertainty about A(θ,r), any type who raises the policy
above r must be spared from devaluation, for otherwise he would be strictly better oﬀ setting r = r.
Furthermore, because the noise in the speculators’ information is unbounded, the observation of
any equilibrium r > r necessarily signals that the peg will be maintained and thus induces all
speculators not to attack no matter their signal x. But then the policy maker can always save on
the cost of intervention by setting the lowest r > r among those that are played in equilibrium.
Finally, that r∗ ≤ ρ(¯ θ) follows from the fact that ρ(θ) ≤ ρ(¯ θ) for all θ, which implies that any
r∗ > ρ(¯ θ) is strictly dominated for all types.
The preceding lemma implies that any equilibrium that does not belong to E(r;σ) necessarily
belongs to E(r∗;σ) for some r∗ ∈ (r,ρ(¯ θ)]. The next three lemmas identify further properties of the
set E(r∗;σ).
Lemma 3 For any r∗ ∈ (r,ρ(¯ θ)] and any equilibrium in E(r∗;σ), D(θ) = 0 for all θ > θ∗, where
θ∗ ∈ (θ,θ] is the lowest solution to ρ(θ) = r∗, or equivalently the unique solution to
V (θ∗,0) = C (r∗). (7)
Proof. Any type θ ≥ θ∗ can guarantee himself a payoﬀ V (θ,0)−C(r∗) ≥ 0 (with strict inequality
for θ > θ∗) by setting r = r∗; this follows directly from the fact that A(θ,r∗) = 0 for any θ. But
then no type above θ∗ abandons the peg.
The threshold θ∗ is thus an upper bound for the set of types who devalue across all equilibria
in E(r∗;σ). Because r∗ is strictly dominated for all θ < θ∗, θ∗ is also a lower bound for the set
of types who raise the policy at r∗. The next lemma identiﬁes an upper bound θ∗∗ for this set; it
further establishes that the level of the policy r∗ can not exceed ˜ r ≡ ρ(˜ θ). The proof is based on
iterated deletion of strategies that cannot be part of an equilibrium.
To state this lemma, and also for future use, we introduce the function X(θ′,θ′′) implicitly




σ ) + Ψ(x−θ′′
σ )
= r. (8)
Note that the left-hand-side of (8) is the probability that a speculator with signal x assigns to
θ < θ′ conditional on θ / ∈ [θ′,θ′′]. The function X(θ′,θ′′) thus identiﬁes the value of x that makes
9a speculator indiﬀerent between attacking and not attacking when that speculator observes r and
believes that D(θ) = 1 if and only if θ < θ′ and r(θ) = r if and only if θ / ∈ [θ′,θ′′]. We can now
state the lemma as follows.
Lemma 4 (i) For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r] and any equilibrium in E(r∗;σ), r(θ) = r∗ only if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗],
where θ∗ is the unique solution to condition (7) and θ∗∗ is the unique solution to








(ii) For any r∗ > ˜ r, E(r∗;σ) = ∅.













   
.
The function g (θ∗,θ′′,θ) can be interpreted as the net payoﬀ from raising the policy from r to r∗
for a type θ who expects no speculator to attack when r = r∗, no matter x, and all speculators to
attack if and only if x < X(θ∗,θ′′) when r = r. (Recall that V (θ∗,0) = C(r∗)).
Now consider the sequence {θn}∞
n=0 constructed as follows. First, let θ0 ∈ (¯ θ,∞) be the highest
solution to ρ(θ) = r∗; that this threshold exists follows from the fact that ρ( ) is continuous with
ρ(¯ θ) > r∗ and limθ→∞ ρ(θ) = r.6 Next, for any n ≥ 1, let





if the set is non-empty, and θn = θ∗ otherwise.
This sequence has a simple meaning. Clearly, raising the policy at r∗ is dominated for any
θ / ∈ [θ∗,θ0]. Given so, a speculator who expects D(θ) = 0 if and only if θ ≥ θ∗ and r(θ) = r if
and only if θ / ∈ [θ∗,θ0] ﬁnds it optimal to attack when observing r if and only if x < X(θ∗,θ0). By
6The last property follows from the assumption that limθ→∞ {V (θ,1) − V (θ,0)} = 0. Without this assumption,
there exist equilibria in which the policy maker intervenes even for arbitrarily high types. These equilibria are
sustained by the speculators threatening to attack no matter how favorable their information is. We ﬁnd such a
property implausible. Furthermore, these equilibria are not robust to the following perturbation. Pick any K > ¯ θ
and any δ > 0 and suppose that with probability δ types θ > K are hit by a shock that forces them to set r and
assume that this shock is not observed by the speculators. The aforementioned equilibria are not robust to this
perturbation, no matter how unlikely these shocks are (i.e. no matter δ,K). Instead of invoking such a reﬁnement,
we prefer to impose the aforementioned limit condition.
10implication, a speculator who expects D(θ) = 0 for all θ ≥ θ∗ (but possibly also for some θ < θ∗)
and r(θ) = r for all θ / ∈ [θ∗,θ0] (but possibly also for some θ ∈ [θ∗,θ0]) never ﬁnds it optimal to
attack for x > X(θ∗,θ0). To see this, note that when the peg is maintained also for some θ < θ∗,
the probability that a speculator assigns to devaluation when he observes r is smaller than when
devaluation occurs for all θ < θ∗. Similarly, when the policy maker sets the policy at r also for
some θ ∈ [θ∗,θ0], the observation of r is less informative of devaluation than when r(θ) = r∗ for
all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ0]. Hence, the incentives to attack after observing r are maximal when D(θ) = 1 for




. But then a policy maker who expects no speculator to attack for x > X(θ∗,θ0)
never ﬁnds it optimal to raise the policy at r∗ for any θ > θ1. Knowing this, no speculator ﬁnds it
optimal to attack when x > X(θ∗,θ1) after observing r, and so on.
In the Appendix (Lemma A1) we establish that the sequence {θn}∞
n=0 is non-increasing. Because
it is also bounded from below by θ∗, it has to converge. Clearly, the limit is the unique θ∗∗ that
solves condition (9) if such a solution exists; otherwise, the limit is θ∗. In the Appendix (Lemma
A1) we further show that condition (9) admits a solution if and only if θ∗ ≤ ˜ θ and that this solution
is strictly above θ∗ if and only if θ∗ < ˜ θ.
The preceding lemma used an iteration “from above” to rule out strategies for which the policy
is raised for θ > θ∗∗. The next lemma uses a similar iteration “from below” to rule out strategies
for which the peg is maintained for θ < θ∗, which together with Lemma 3 completely characterizes
the devaluation outcome.
Lemma 5 For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r] and any equilibrium in E(r∗;σ), D(θ) = 1 for any θ < θ∗.
Proof. The result is established by comparing the speculators’ incentives to attack after observing
r with the corresponding incentives when they expect r(θ) = r for all θ.
Let {θn}
∞







σ )) = 0 with xn−1 implicitly deﬁned by 1−Ψ(
xn−1−θn−1
σ ) = r. This sequence
also has a simple interpretation. When devaluation occurs at r if and only if θ < θ, a speculator
who believes that r(θ) = r for all θ ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if x < x0. By implication,
a speculator who expects r(θ) = r for all θ < θ∗ (but possibly r(θ) > r for some θ > θ∗) necessarily
ﬁnds it optimal to attack for any x < x0. This simply follows from the fact that the observation of
11r is most informative of devaluation when all types who devalue set r = r, while some of the types
who maintain the peg raise the policy at r∗. However, if all speculators attack whenever x < x0,
the peg is abandoned for all θ < θ1. This in turn implies that there exists an x1 > x0 such that a
speculator who expects the peg to be abandoned for all θ < θ1 and who believes that r(θ) = r for
all θ, ﬁnds it optimal to attack for all x < x1. By implication, a speculator who expects r(θ) = r
for all θ < θ∗ but possibly r(θ) > r for some θ > θ∗, necessarily ﬁnds it optimal to attack for any
x < x1, and so on.
Because {θn}
∞
n=0 is increasing and bounded from above it necessarily converges. Note that V
and Ψ are continuous and that the unique ﬁxed point to V (θ,Ψ(x−θ
σ )) = 0 and 1 − Ψ(x−θ
σ ) = r
is attained at θ = ˜ θ and x = ˜ x. Because θ∗ ≤ ˜ θ, the limit of {θn}
∞
n=0 is clearly θ∗. It follows that
D(θ) = 1 for all θ < θ∗.
The results in the preceding lemmas identify the core restrictions on equilibrium outcomes: in
any equilibrium in which the policy is raised, there exists at most one r∗ > r played in equilibrium,
the policy is raised to r∗ only if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗], the peg is abandoned if θ < θ∗ and is maintained if
θ > θ∗.
What these results leave open is the possibility that the policy is raised only for a strict subset of
(θ∗,θ∗∗). Although such a possibility would not aﬀect the predictions we discuss in the subsequent
sections in any serious way, it requires that the speculators’ strategy after observing r = r be
non-monotonic in x, which in turn requires that posterior beliefs about θ given r be non-monotone
in x. This possibility is ruled out by the following result (whose proof is rather technical and is
thus in the Appendix).
Lemma 6 For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r] and any equilibrium in E(r∗;σ), the following are true:
(i) If a(x,r) is decreasing in x, then r(θ) = r∗ if θ ∈ (θ∗,θ∗∗), a(x,r) = 1 if x < x∗, and
a(x,r) = 0 if x > x∗, where x∗ = X (θ∗,θ∗∗).
(ii) If ψ is log-concave, then a(x,r) is decreasing in x.
So far we have identiﬁed sharp, but only necessary, conditions for the set of equilibrium out-
comes. The next lemma completes the equilibrium characterization by showing that E (r;σ)  = ∅
and E (r∗;σ)  = ∅ for any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r]. This last result follows from adapting Proposition 2 in
Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) to the diﬀerent payoﬀ structure assumed here.
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x < ˜ x, and D(θ) = 1 if and only if θ < ˜ θ.
(ii) For any r∗ ∈ (r, ˜ r], there exists an equilibrium in which r(θ) = r∗ if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗], r(θ) = r
otherwise, a(x,r) = 1 if and only if (x,r) < (x∗,r∗), and D(θ) = 1 if and only if θ < θ∗.
The strategies in Lemma 7 are particularly simple and permit us to identify r∗ as the level
of policy intervention at which the speculators switch from “aggressive” to “lenient” behavior.
Although other strategies can also sustain the same equilibrium outcomes, Lemmas 2-6 ensure that
these other strategies can diﬀer only out of equilibrium (or for a zero-measure set of θ and x on
equilibrium).7
Combining all the aforementioned results completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Remark. The equilibrium deﬁnition we have used rules out mixed strategies for either the
policy maker or the speculators; it also imposes symmetry on the speculators’ strategies. However,
from the arguments in the proofs of Lemmas 1-6, it should be clear that none of the necessary
conditions identiﬁed in these lemmas depend on these restrictions. Indeed, the policy maker can
ﬁnd it optimal to randomize over r, or over D, only for a zero-measure subset of θ; because
this does not have any eﬀect on the speculators’ posterior beliefs about policy and devaluation
outcomes, it cannot aﬀect their best-responses. Similarly, for any r, the speculators can ﬁnd it
optimal to randomize over a, or to play asymmetrically, only for a zero-measure subset of their
signal space; because this does not have any eﬀect on the aggregate size of attack, it does not
aﬀect the policy maker’s incentives. Proposition 1 thus characterizes the entire set of equilibrium
outcomes, including those sustained by mixed-strategy or asymmetric equilibria.
4 Predictions about policies and devaluation outcomes
In this section, we show how the complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes as
given by Proposition 1 permits us to identify predictions regarding the structure of policy choices
and devaluation outcomes that are not sensitive to equilibrium selection.
7Moreover, the strategies and the beliefs considered in the proof of Lemma 7 survive the intuitive criterion of
Cho and Kreps (1987) and can be obtained as the limit to perturbations that introduce full-support noise in policy
observations so that beliefs are always pinned down by Bayes’ rule. This follows from arguments similar to those in
Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006).
13Following Proposition 1, we henceforth index equilibria by s ∈ [r, ˜ r]. To highlight the dependence
of the equilibrium outcomes on the quality of information σ, for any s ∈ [r, ˜ r], we denote by rs (θ;σ),
Ds (θ;σ) and Ds(σ) ≡ {θ : Ds(θ;σ) = 1} respectively the equilibrium policy, the devaluation
outcome, and set of types who abandon the peg, in any equilibrium in E (s;σ). For any s ∈ (r, ˜ r], we
then let θ∗
s(σ) and θ∗∗
s (σ) denote the corresponding thresholds as deﬁned in part (iii) of Proposition
1 and ∆s(σ) ≡ θ∗∗
s (σ) − θ∗
s(σ) the (Lebesgue) measure of types who intervene. Finally, to save on
notation, we also let θ∗
r(σ) ≡ θ∗∗
r (σ) ≡ ˜ θ for any σ > 0, where ˜ θ is the devaluation threshold in any
of the pooling equilibria of part (ii) in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 (policy choices and regime outcomes) Equilibrium policies and devaluation
outcomes satisfy the following properties.
(i) Non-monotonic policy. For any σ > 0 and any s > r, rs (θ;σ) is inverted U-shaped in
θ, and rs (θ;σ) ≤ ˜ r for all θ.
(ii) Monotonic devaluation outcome. For any σ > 0 and any s, Ds (θ;σ) is decreasing in
θ, and Ds(σ) ⊆ (−∞, ˜ θ).
(iii) Impact of aggressiveness. For any σ > 0, s′ > s > r implies ∆s′(σ) < ∆s(σ), whereas
Ds′(σ) ⊃ Ds(σ).
(iv) Impact of noise. For any s ∈ (r, ˜ r), σ′ > σ > 0 implies ∆s(σ′) > ∆s(σ), whereas
Ds(σ′) = Ds(σ). Moreover, limσ→0 ∆s(σ) = 0.
The ﬁrst two properties establish that, no matter which equilibrium is played, (i) the policy
maker intervenes only for intermediate θ and never raises r above ˜ r; (ii) the peg is abandoned
if and only if θ is low enough and never for θ > ˜ θ. These predictions follow directly from the
characterization result of Proposition 1.
Property (iii), on the other hand, can be interpreted as the impact of the “aggressiveness”of
market expectations: the higher the level of the policy at which the speculators switch to lenient
behavior (i.e., refrain from attacking), the higher the cost of intervention necessary for preventing
an attack, and hence the smaller the set of types who ﬁnd it optimal to intervene and the larger
the set of types who abandon the peg.
Finally, property (iv) shows that, for given “aggressiveness,” the set of types who ﬁnd it optimal
to intervene shrinks as the speculators’ information becomes more precise, whereas the set of types
who devalue is independent of σ. To understand this result, recall that the opportunity cost of
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s(σ), which explains why θ∗
s(σ) is independent
of σ. On the other hand, the opportunity cost for θ = θ∗∗
s (σ) is facing a positive attack which
however does not lead to devaluation; as σ → 0, the size of attack vanishes for any θ > θ∗
s(σ) and
θ∗∗
s (σ) converges to θ∗
s(σ).
The predictions identiﬁed in Proposition 2 presume that the outside observer, say the econome-
trician, knows which equilibrium is played (although they are true for any equilibrium). We now
turn to the predictions that the model delivers for an econometrician who is uncertain about which
equilibrium is played. This uncertainty can be captured by introducing a distribution over the set
of all possible equilibria and examining the implied distribution of equilibrium outcomes.
Because diﬀerent equilibria within E (s,σ) lead to the same outcomes, any distribution over
outcomes generated by a random selection over the equilibrium set E (σ) can be replicated by a
random variable s with support [r, ˜ r] such that a pooling equilibrium is played when s = r, while
a semi-separating equilibrium in which r∗ = s is played when s ∈ (r, ˜ r]. We then denote by F the
family of all possible cumulative distribution functions over [r, ˜ r]. As far as outcomes are concerned,
any beliefs the econometrician may have about which equilibrium is played simply corresponds to
an element of F.8
Note that, because θ is the policy maker’s private information, the speculators’ strategies cannot
depend directly on θ; they can only be functions of the information the speculators have about θ.
It follows that the equilibrium being played cannot be a function of θ; equivalently, the realization
of the random variable s has to be independent of θ.
Now, let Ipremise denote the indicator function assuming value one if premise is true and zero
otherwise. Next, for any F ∈ F, let D(θ;F,σ) ≡
 
s∈[r,˜ r] Ds(θ;σ)dF(s) denote the probability that
type θ abandons the peg, P(r,θ;F,σ) ≡
 
s∈[r,˜ r] I{rs(θ)≥r}dF(s) the probability that type θ raises
the policy at or above r, and ∆(r;F,σ) ≡
 
θ∈R I{P(r,θ;F,σ)>0}dθ the (Lebesgue) measure of types
who raise the policy at or above r with positive probability, when the selection is F. Finally, let
F′ ≫ F if and only if F′(r) ≤ F(r) for all r, with strict inequality for r ∈ (r, ˜ r) and equality
for r ∈ {r, ˜ r}. The following result then translates the deterministic predictions of Proposition 2
into their probabilistic analogues for the case in which the econometrician is uncertain about which
equilibrium is played.
8Note that s could also be interpreted as a sunspot that is used by the players to determine which equilibrium to
play; the set F can thus also be interpreted as the set of sunspot equilibria.
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σ > 0, there exist θ◦ and θ◦◦, with θ < θ◦ ≤ θ◦◦, such that P(r,θ;F,σ) > 0 only if r ≤ ˜ r and
θ ∈ [θ◦,θ◦◦].
(ii) For any σ > 0 and any F ∈ F, D(θ;F,σ) is non-increasing in θ, with D(θ;F,σ) = 1 for
θ ≤ θ and D(θ;F,σ) = 0 for θ ≥ ˜ θ.
(iii) For any σ > 0, F′ ≫ F implies ∆(r,F′,σ) < ∆(r,F,σ) for all r ∈ (r, ˜ r), whereas
D(θ;F′,σ) > D(θ;F,σ) for all θ ∈ (θ, ˜ θ) (unless D(θ;F,σ) = 1).
(iv) For any F ∈ F, σ′ > σ > 0 implies ∆(r,F,σ′) > ∆(r,F,σ) for all r ∈ (r, ˜ r) (unless
∆(r,F,σ) = 0), whereas D(θ;F,σ′) = D(θ;F,σ) for all θ. Moreover, limσ→0 ∆(r,F,σ) = 0.
Parts (i) and (ii) say that, no matter F, the probability of observing a policy above r is positive
only for intermediate θ, and the probability of devaluation is monotonic in θ. Part (iii) says that, if
the econometrician expects the players to coordinate on more aggressive equilibria, then he should
also expect a smaller set of types to raise the policy and a higher probability of devaluation for any
θ. Finally, part (iv) says that, holding F constant, more precise information does not aﬀect the
probability of devaluation but induces fewer types to intervene with positive probability.
One frequent criticism of common-knowledge models of crises, such as Obstfeld (1986, 1996) and
Calvo (1986), is that they document the existence of a critical region of fundamentals over which
there are multiple equilibria, but say little about the relation between fundamentals and equilibrium
outcomes. For example, the probability of devaluation in Obstfeld need not be monotonic in the
strength of the currency. In contrast, the result in part (ii) of Proposition 3 delivers a monotonic
relation between the fundamentals (the policy maker’s type) and the devaluation outcome, while
at the same time allowing for “randomness” in this relation generated by the econometrician’s
uncertainty over the equilibrium selected.
The result in part (iv), on the other hand, is interesting because it suggests that the precision
of information is not important for whether the peg is maintained, but it is crucial for whether
this goal is achieved with or without intervention. Note, however, that this result presumes that F
does not change with σ. Because the model imposes no relation between F and σ, this is possible,
although not necessary.
Now suppose that one is completely agnostic on whether, or how, the equilibrium selection F
changes with σ. Is it still possible to say anything about the relation between the equilibrium
16outcomes and the quality of information? The answer is yes. It suﬃces to consider the bounds on
the probability of devaluation and on the probability of intervention across all possible equilibria.
Let D(θ1,θ2;F,σ) ≡ 1
θ2−θ1
  θ2




θ1 P(r,θ;F,σ)dθ denote the probability that the policy is raised at or above r, both condi-
tional on the event that θ ∈ [θ1,θ2], for given selection F. Then let ¯ D(θ1,θ2;σ) ≡ supF∈F D(θ1,θ2;F,σ),
D(θ1,θ2;σ) ≡ infsupF∈F D(θ1,θ2;F,σ), ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) ≡ supF∈F P(r,θ1,θ2;F,σ), and P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) ≡
infF∈F P(r,θ1,θ2;F,σ); these are bounds on the equilibrium probabilities of devaluation and pol-
icy interventions. Clearly, ¯ D(θ1,θ2;σ) ≥ D(θ1,θ2;σ) and ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) ≥ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ), with strict
inequalities when θ ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ ˜ θ and r ∈ (r, ˜ r). That these bounds do not coincide over a subset
of the critical region reﬂects the equilibrium indeterminacy. The next proposition examines how
these bounds depend on the quality of information.
Proposition 4 (bounds) The bounds D, ¯ D, and P are independent of σ. In contrast, ¯ P is a
nondecreasing function of σ, with limσ→0 ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) = 0 for any r >r and any θ1,θ2 ∈ R.
Therefore, more precise information does not aﬀect the range of equilibrium probabilities of
devaluation but it reduces the range of equilibrium probabilities of intervention. What is more,
in the limit as σ → 0, the probability of raising the policy vanishes for all measurable sets of θ,
whereas the probability of devaluation can take any value for any subset of (θ, ˜ θ). In essence, the
policy choices are uniquely determined in the limit, even though the devaluation outcomes remain
indeterminate.
5 Predictions about payoﬀs
We now turn to the predictions the model delivers for the payoﬀ of the policy maker. In contrast
to predictions about policy choices and devaluation outcomes, predictions about payoﬀs need not
be directly testable (the econometrician cannot directly observe the policy maker’s payoﬀs). Nev-
ertheless, these predictions are important for their policy implications. For example, they permit
us to characterize the ex-ante value the policy maker may attach to the option to intervene once θ
is realized.
Let Us (θ;σ) denote the payoﬀ that type θ obtains in any of the equilibria in E (s;σ). Next,
consider the variant of our model in which r is exogenously ﬁxed at r for all θ, interpret this as
17the game in which the option to intervene is absent, and let ˜ U (θ;σ) denote the payoﬀ that type θ
obtains in the unique equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 5 (payoﬀs) (i) For any s and any σ > 0, Us (θ;σ) is increasing in θ.
(ii) For any s ∈ (r, ˜ r), either it is the case that Us (θ;σ) ≥ ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ, with strict inequality
for some θ, or there exists θ
#
s (σ) > ˜ θ such that Us(θ,σ) ≥ ˜ U (θ;σ) if and only if θ ≤ θ
#
s (σ), with
strict inequality for θ ∈ (θ∗
s(σ),θ
#
s (σ)). Moreover, σ small enough ensures that the ﬁrst case holds.
Part (i) establishes that payoﬀs, like devaluation outcomes, are monotonic in θ, no matter the
equilibrium selected. This follows from the fact that, in any equilibrium, the speculators’ response
to r ∈ {r,s} is monotonic in x, which implies that higher types can always do as well as lower types
by taking the same actions that the latter take.
Part (ii), on the other hand, establishes that the policy maker can be worse oﬀ with the option to
intervene only when the equilibrium selected is such that s ∈ (r, ˜ r) and both θ and σ are suﬃciently
high. Clearly, when s ∈ {r, ˜ r}, Us (θ;σ) = ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ.9 Thus consider an equilibrium in which
s ∈ (r, ˜ r) and let θ∗
s(σ) and θ∗∗




That types θ ≤ ˜ θ can not be worse oﬀ follows from the fact that these types necessarily abandon
the peg in the game without the option to intervene. Types θ > ˜ θ, on the other hand, can be
worse oﬀ only if x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x, that is, only if the size of the attack they face when they set r = r
is higher than the one they would have faced without the option to intervene. When this is the
case, all types θ ≥ θ∗∗
s (σ) are clearly worse oﬀ. On the other hand, type ˜ θ is strictly better oﬀ;
in fact, s < ˜ r implies that θ∗
s(σ) < ˜ θ and hence type ˜ θ can guarantee himself a strictly positive
payoﬀ by raising the policy at r = s, whereas he would have obtained a zero payoﬀ absent the
possibility to intervene. Together with the fact that V (θ,0) − C (s) − V
 
θ,Φ




diﬀerential between the two games for types θ ∈ [˜ θ,θ∗∗
s (σ)] who ﬁnd it optimal to intervene, is
continuous and decreasing in θ (by the assumption that VθA ≥ 0), this ensures that there exists a
θ
#
s (σ) ∈ (˜ θ,θ∗∗
s (σ)) such that the policy maker is worse oﬀ if and only if θ > θ
#
s (σ). However, as
we show in the Appendix, for any given s ∈ (r, ˜ r), a suﬃciently low σ ensures that x∗
s(σ) is smaller
than ˜ x, and hence that the policy maker is always better oﬀ, whatever his type. This follows from
the fact that θ∗∗
s (σ) → θ∗
s(σ) and x∗
s(σ) → θ∗
s(σ), whereas ˜ x → ˜ θ as σ → 0, which together with the
fact that θ∗
s(σ) < ˜ θ whenever s ∈ (r, ˜ r) ensures that x∗
s(σ) < ˜ x for σ small enough.
9Recall that when s = ˜ r, θ
∗
s(σ) = ˜ θ = θ
∗∗
s (σ) and x
∗
s(σ) = ˜ x.
18These results can easily be extended to arbitrary random equilibrium selections F ∈ F. Indeed,
part (i) directly implies that, for any F, the expected payoﬀ U(θ;F,σ) ≡
 
s∈[r,˜ r] Us(θ,σ)dF is
increasing in θ. Part (ii), on the other hand, implies that, if we ﬁx an arbitrary set of types
[θ1,θ2] ⊂ R and an arbitrary selection F and consider the implied probability that, conditional on
θ ∈ [θ1,θ2], the policy maker is strictly worse oﬀ, then this probability is zero either for all σ, or
at least for σ small enough. Notwithstanding the fact that, in general, the selection F may also
depend on σ, this property suggests that the risk of being worse oﬀ with the option to intervene
vanishes as market information becomes highly precise.
Furthermore, we can accommodate the case that F changes with σ by considering bounds on
equilibrium payoﬀs across all possible equilibria. Let U (θ;σ) ≡ sups∈[r,˜ r] Us (θ;σ) and U (θ;σ) ≡
infs∈[r,˜ r] Us (θ;σ). The following proposition characterizes the relation between these bounds and
the payoﬀ obtained in the game without the option to intervene.
Proposition 6 (payoﬀ bounds) U (θ;σ) = V (θ,0) > ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ > θ. On the other
hand, there exists ˆ θ(σ) ≥ ˜ θ such that U (θ;σ) < ˜ U (θ;σ) if and only if θ > ˆ θ (σ). Finally,
limσ→0 U (θ;σ) = limσ→0 ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ.
Consider ﬁrst the supremum of the equilibrium payoﬀs. For any θ > θ, the highest feasible
payoﬀ is V (θ,0), the payoﬀ enjoyed when no speculator attacks. This payoﬀ can be approximated
arbitrarily well in the game in which intervention is possible (it suﬃces to take any equilibrium in
which s is suﬃciently close to r) but not in the game in which the option to intervene is absent.
Next consider the inﬁmum of the equilibrium payoﬀs. Type θ can be worse oﬀ in some equilibria
of the game with the option to intervene only if θ is above some threshold ˆ θ(σ) ∈ [˜ θ,∞). This
is a direct implication of part (ii) of Proposition 5: no type θ ≤ ˜ θ can be worse oﬀ, and if a type
θ > ˜ θ is strictly worse oﬀ in some equilibrium, then any θ′ > θ is also strictly worse oﬀ in the
same equilibrium. That ˆ θ (σ) < ∞ follows from the fact that, for any given σ, one can ﬁnd an
equilibrium with s close enough to r such that x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x. In such equilibrium, any θ > θ∗∗
s (σ) is
strictly worse oﬀ.
Simulations suggest that ˆ θ(σ) → ¯ θ as σ → 0, meaning that the subset of the critical region
where the policy maker can be worse oﬀ with the option to intervene vanishes as information
becomes inﬁnitely precise. We have not been able to prove that this is true in general. However
19we have proved that ˆ θ(σ) is strictly higher than ˜ θ for σ small enough.10
Finally, to see why, for any θ, the diﬀerence between U (θ;σ) and ˜ U (θ;σ) vanishes as σ → 0,
note that, for any θ ≤ ˜ θ, this diﬀerence is clearly zero because the lower bound is simply the payoﬀ
obtained in any equilibrium in which type θ is forced to abandon the peg. For types θ > ˜ θ, on the
other hand, the lower bound on possible payoﬀs is obtained by considering equilibria in which the
size of attack the policy maker faces if he does not raise the policy is higher than the one he would
have faced if he did not have the option to intervene.11 When σ is small enough, this possibility
(that x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x) requires that s be close enough to r, and the closer so the smaller σ. But then,
because any θ > ˜ θ can always opt to raise the policy ensuring a payoﬀ V (θ,0) − C (s), the lower
bound on possible payoﬀs necessarily converges to V (θ,0) for any θ > ˜ θ. Because this is also the
payoﬀ that the policy makes obtains in the game without the option to intervene as σ → 0, we
conclude that limσ→0 U (θ;σ) = limσ→0 ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ.
Now imagine that, before knowing his type, the policy maker decides whether to maintain or
to give up the option to intervene after learning θ. The aforementioned results suggest that, in
general, the policy maker need not be able to ensure that he will be better oﬀ with the option to
intervene no matter the realized θ: he may get “trapped” in an equilibrium in which he is worse
oﬀ when θ turns out to be suﬃciently high. Even then, however, the policy maker is better oﬀ for
low θ. Therefore, the option to intervene either is beneﬁcial for all θ, or it implements a form of
insurance across types.
6 Contrast to common knowledge
We now contrast the predictions of the incomplete-information game with those of its common-
knowledge counterpart. We further show that, while multiplicity obtains in our model for any level
of noise, the set of equilibrium outcomes becomes smaller (in an appropriate sense) the more precise
the speculators’ private information, but explodes at zero noise. The purpose of these exercises is to
highlight that the selection power of global games has signiﬁcant bite also in our multiple-equilibria
10This follows from the fact that, when σ is small, x
∗
s(σ) > ˜ x is possible only for r
∗ bounded away from ˜ r; but then
in any such equilibrium type ˜ θ and, by continuity, all types θ in a right neighborhood of ˜ θ are necessarily strictly
better oﬀ. See the Appendix for details.
11This follows from the fact that U (θ;σ) ≤ ˜ U (θ;σ) for all θ. Indeed, the game with the option to intervene always
admits two equilibria in which all types obtain the same payoﬀ as in the unique equilibrium of the game without this
option; these are the pooling equilibrium (s = r) and the semi-separating equilibrium in which s = ˜ r.
20setting and to establish that the predictions we have identiﬁed, albeit quite intuitive, would not
have been possible with complete information.
Proposition 7 (common knowledge) Consider the game with σ = 0.
(i) A policy r( ) can be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if r(θ) ≤ ρ(θ) for
θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] and r(θ) = r for θ / ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].
(ii) A devaluation outcome D( ) can be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if
D(θ) = 1 for θ < θ, D(θ) ∈ {0,1} for θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ], and D(θ) = 0 for θ > ¯ θ.
This result contrasts sharply with the results in Propositions 1 and 2. None of the predictions
in the game with incomplete information are valid in the game with common knowledge. In
particular, the policy can now exceed ˜ r for θ ∈ (˜ θ, ¯ θ] and can take any shape in the critical region
[θ, ¯ θ]. Similarly, the probability of devaluation can take any value within the critical region, it need
not be monotonic in θ, and can be positive also for θ > ˜ θ.
Under complete-information, the only policy choices and devaluation outcomes that are ruled
out by equilibrium reasoning are those that are ruled out by strict dominance. In essence, “almost
anything goes” within the critical region under complete information.
The contrast between the complete- and incomplete-information versions of our model is most
evident in the limit as σ → 0. Let G(σ) denote the set of pairs (θ,r) such that, in the game with
noise σ ≥ 0, there is an equilibrium in which type θ sets the policy at r.
Proposition 8 (limit outcomes) Under complete information,
G(0) = {(θ,r) : either θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] and r ≤ r ≤ ρ(θ), or θ / ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] and r = r}.
In contrast, under incomplete information,
lim
σ→0+ G(σ) = {(θ,r) : either θ ∈ [θ, ˜ θ] and r ∈ {r,ρ(θ)}, or θ / ∈ [θ, ˜ θ] and r = r},
which is a zero-measure subset of G(0).
This result is illustrated in Figure 1. The common-knowledge set, G(0), is given by the large
triangular area. The incomplete-information set, G(σ) for σ > 0, is given by the dashed area. As
long as σ > 0, the lower σ is, the smaller the set of policies that can be played by any given θ, and
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Figure 1: Pairs (θ,r) that can be observed as equilibrium outcomes.
hence the smaller the dashed area in Figure 1 (i.e., σ′ > σ > 0 implies G(σ′) ⊃ G(σ)). In this sense,
the predictions of the model become sharper as the noise in the speculators’ information becomes
smaller. Indeed, the predictions are sharpest in the limit as σ → 0+. The set G(σ) then converges to
the boundary points of the set of policies that would have been possible under complete information
for any θ ≤ ˜ θ, and to the cost-minimizing policy for θ > ˜ θ.
The restrictions that incomplete information poses on equilibrium outcomes are useful for iden-
tiﬁcation when one estimates the model. For example, suppose the speculators’ opportunity cost
of attacking is r + c, for some c ∈ (−r,1 − ¯ r). Further assume that the econometrician does not
know c and tries to estimate it assuming that the data are generated from our model. The set
of common-knowledge equilibrium outcomes is insensitive to c, implying that c cannot be iden-
tiﬁed (unless one makes “ad hoc” assumptions on equilibrium selection). In contrast, the set of
incomplete-information equilibrium outcomes shrinks with c, in the sense that both ˜ θ and ˜ r decrease
with c; it is this kind of sensitivity that can help identiﬁcation.
7 Conclusion
The approach followed in most recent applications of global games is to use incomplete information
as a tool to select a unique equilibrium in coordination settings that admit multiple equilibria under
common knowledge: to assume certain exogenous information structures that ensure uniqueness,
22without investigating what determines information in the ﬁrst place. For certain questions, however,
understanding the endogeneity of information is essential for understanding the phenomenon under
examination. This often brings back multiple equilibria. However, this multiplicity is very diﬀerent
from the one that emerges with complete information. More importantly, this multiplicity need
not preclude concrete and testable predictions that are robust across all equilibria.
In this paper, we demonstrated these points in the context of defense policies against speculative
currency attacks. However, these points are likely to be relevant also for other applications that
endogenize information in global games. These include learning in dynamic settings (Angeletos,
Hellwig and Pavan, 2007), aggregation of information through prices (Angeletos and Werning,
2006; Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski, 2006; Morris and Shin, 2006a; Ozdenoren and Yuan,
2006; Tarashev, 2006), and manipulation of information through propaganda (Edmond, 2006). In
Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007), for example, learning sustains multiplicity but all equilibria
share the prediction that dynamics alternate between phases of tranquility, in which no attack is
possible, and phases of distress, in which an attack is possible but does not necessarily take place.
Finally, in this paper we did not confront the predictions we delivered with the data. This is
clearly an important next step for future research. The task is challenging, but recent advances in
structural estimation of models with multiple equilibria seem to help in this direction.
23Appendix: proofs omitted in the main text
Lemma A1. (i) The sequence {θn}∞
n=0 deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 4 is non-increasing.
(ii) Condition (9) admits a solution if and only if θ∗ ≤ ˜ θ. Furthermore, this solution is strictly
above θ∗ for any θ∗ < ˜ θ.
Proof of Lemma A1. Part (i). Let








and note that, by the assumptions that VA < 0 < Vθ and VθA ≥ 0, ˜ g(θ∗,θn−1,θ) is decreasing in θ,















≥ 0, then g(θ∗,θn−1,θ) = ˜ g(θ∗,θn−1,θ) <
























< 0, then θn > θ∗ is the
highest solution to ˜ g(θ∗,θn−1,θ) = 0, or equivalently θn = f
 
θn−1 
where f (θ) is an increasing
function deﬁned implicitly by ˜ g (θ∗,θ,f (θ)) = 0. To prove that the sequence {θn}∞
n=0 is non-
increasing, it thus suﬃces to show that θ1 < θ0. To see this, note that













is decreasing in θ proves that θ1 < θ0.
Part (ii). Note that the function








is continuously decreasing in θ with G(θ∗,θ∗) = −V (θ∗,1 − r) and limθ→∞ G(θ∗,θ) = −V (θ∗,0) <















is increasing in θ
with ˜ V (θ) < 0 (resp. ˜ V (θ) > 0) if and only if θ < ˜ θ (resp. θ > ˜ θ), a solution to (9) exists if and
only if θ∗ ≤ ˜ θ and is strictly above θ∗ for any θ∗ < ˜ θ. Q.E.D.
24Proof of Lemma 6. Part (i). When r∗ = ˜ r, θ∗ = θ∗∗ = ˜ θ, x∗ = X (θ∗,θ∗∗) = ˜ x, and, by Lemma
4, r(θ) = r for all θ  = ˜ θ; the result then follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma
1. Thus consider r∗ < ˜ r, in which case θ∗ < ˜ θ and θ∗ < θ∗∗. From the proof of Lemma 4, a(x,r) = 0
































> 0. Combining, we have that V (θ∗,A(θ∗,r)) < 0 < V (θ∗∗,A(θ∗∗,r)), which
together with the monotonicity of A in θ ensures that there exists a unique ˆ θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗) such that
V (θ,A(θ,r)) < 0 if and only if θ < ˆ θ.
Now let θ′′ = sup{θ : r(θ) = r∗}. Clearly, θ′′ ≥ ˆ θ; if θ′′ < ˆ θ, types θ ∈ (θ′′, ˆ θ) would be
better oﬀ raising the policy. But then θ′′ must solve the indiﬀerence condition V (θ′′,0) − C(r∗) =
V (θ′′,A(θ′′,r)). This together with the monotonicity of A in θ and the assumption that VθA ≥ 0
ensures that all θ ∈ [θ∗,θ′′] necessarily set r∗. The posterior probability that a speculator assigns





σ ) + Ψ(x−θ′′
σ )
.
Since µ(θ∗|x,r) is decreasing in x, a(x,r) = 1 if x < x′ and a(x,r) = 0 if x > x′, where
x′ ≡ X (θ∗,θ′′). This in turn implies that A(θ′′,r) = Ψ(
X(θ∗,θ′′)−θ′′
σ ) and therefore θ′′ must solve







, which is the same as condition (9). That is, θ′′ = θ∗∗
and hence x′ = x∗.
Part (ii) We now show that if ψ is log-concave, a(x,r) is decreasing in x. The probability of






θ∗ [1 − I (θ)] 1
σψ(x−θ
σ )dθ
with I(θ) = 0 when r(θ) = r and I(θ) = 1 when r(θ) = r∗. It follows that µ(θ∗|x,r) is decreasing









































   













   





which holds true when ψ′/ψ is decreasing, i.e. when ψ is log-concave. The monotonicity of µ(θ∗|x,r)
in x then implies monotonicity of a(x,r). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7. For both parts we let the strategy of the policy maker in stage 3 be such
that D(θ,r,A) = 0 when V (θ,A) = 0, meaning that, when indiﬀerent, the policy maker maintains
the peg.
Part (i). Because A(θ,r) is independent of r, r(θ) = r is clearly optimal for the policy maker;
the optimality of D( ) is obvious. Thus consider the speculators. Because D(θ,r,A(θ,r)) = 1 if
and only if θ < ˜ θ, a speculator ﬁnds it optimal to follow the equilibrium strategy if and only if, for
any r, his beliefs satisfy
µ(˜ θ|x,r) ≥ r if x < ˜ x and µ(˜ θ|x,r) ≤ r if x ≥ ˜ x. (13)
When r = r, Bayes’ rule imposes that µ(θ|x,r) = 1−Ψ(x−θ
σ ); that these beliefs satisfy (13) follows
directly from the deﬁnition of ˜ x. When, instead, r > r, a deviation is detected whatever x. There
then exists an arbitrarily large set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy (13).
Part (ii). Because A(θ,r) = A(θ,r) = Ψ(x∗−θ
σ ) for any r < r∗ and A(θ,r) = A(θ,r∗) = 0
for any r ≥ r∗, the policy maker clearly prefers r to any r ∈ (r,r∗) and r∗ to any r > r∗.
Furthermore, r is dominant for any θ ≤ θ. For θ > θ, on the other hand, the payoﬀ from setting r∗
is V (θ,0) − C (r∗), while the payoﬀ from setting r is max{0,V (θ,A(θ,r))}. Hence, r∗ is optimal
if and only if C(r∗) ≤ V (θ,0) and C(r∗) ≤ V (θ,0) − V (θ,A(θ,r)). From the deﬁnitions of θ∗, θ∗∗
and x∗ this is the case if and only if θ ∈ [θ∗,θ∗∗]. Now consider the speculators. When r < r∗,
D(θ,r,A(θ,r)) = 1 if and only if θ < ˆ θ, where ˆ θ solves V (ˆ θ,Ψ(x∗−ˆ θ
σ )) = 0 (note that θ∗ ≤ ˆ θ ≤ θ∗∗,
with strict inequalities for r∗ < ˜ r). When, instead, r ≥ r∗, D(θ,r,A(θ,r)) = 1 if and only if θ < θ.
A speculator thus ﬁnds it optimal to follow the equilibrium strategy if and only if his beliefs satisfy
26the following two conditions:
when r < r∗, µ(ˆ θ|x,r) ≥ r if x < x∗ and µ(ˆ θ|x,r) ≤ r if x ≥ x∗; (14)
when r ≥ r∗, µ(θ|x,r) ≤ r for all x. (15)
Beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule when either r = r or r = r∗. In the ﬁrst case (r = r),




σ ) + Ψ(x−θ∗∗
σ )
,
which is decreasing in x and equals r at x = x∗, thus satisfying (14). In the second case (r = r∗),
µ(θ|x,r∗) = 0, which clearly satisﬁes (15). Finally, whenever r / ∈ {r,r∗}, there exist an arbitrarily
large set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy (14) and (15). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Parts (i)-(ii) follow directly from Proposition 1. Thus consider
parts (iii) and (iv). Let θ∗
s (σ) and θ∗∗
s (σ) denote the (unique) thresholds corresponding to the
equilibria in which the policy is raised at s ∈ (r, ˜ r]. The threshold θ∗
s (σ) is the unique solution to
V (θ∗,0) = C (s), whereas θ∗∗
s (σ) is the unique solution to G(θ∗
s (σ),θ∗∗;σ) = 0, where, for any
θ ≥ θ∗ and any σ > 0, the function G(θ∗,θ;σ) is as deﬁned in (11). Now let




















For any θ > θ∗, B (θ∗,θ;σ) and hence also G(θ∗,θ;σ) is increasing in σ. Because G(θ∗,θ;σ) is
decreasing in θ, by the Implicit Function Theorem, θ∗∗
s (σ) is increasing in σ. Moreover, for any
θ > θ∗, limσ→0+ B (θ∗,θ;σ) = 0 and hence limσ→0+ G(θ∗,θ;σ) = −V (θ∗,0) < 0, which implies
that θ∗∗
s (σ) converges to θ∗
s (σ) as σ → 0. Finally, that Ds(σ) = (−∞,θ∗
s(σ)) is independent of σ
follows directly from the fact that θ∗
s(σ) is independent of σ. This completes the proof of part (iv).
For part (iii), let ∆s(σ) ≡ θ∗∗
s (σ) − θ∗
s(σ). We seek to prove that ∆s(σ) is decreasing in s, with
27∆s(σ) → 0 as s → ˜ r. Note that ∆s(σ) solves ˆ G(θ∗
s(σ),∆;σ) = 0, where
ˆ G(θ∗,∆;σ) ≡ G(θ∗,θ∗ + ∆;σ) = V (θ∗ + ∆,0) − V (θ∗,0) − V
 
θ∗ + ∆, ˆ B(∆;σ)
 












Because G(θ∗,θ;σ) is decreasing in θ, ˆ G(θ∗,∆;σ) is decreasing in ∆. To see that ˆ G(θ∗,∆;σ) is
also decreasing in θ∗, note that
ˆ Gθ∗ (θ∗,∆;σ) = Vθ (θ∗ + ∆,0) − Vθ (θ∗,0) − Vθ
 
θ∗ + ∆, ˆ B(∆;σ)
 
.
The above is negative because Vθ > 0 and VθA ≥ 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, ∆s(σ)
thus decreases with θ∗
s (σ) and hence with s. The continuity of ∆s(σ) in s (which follows from the
continuity of G in θ∗ and θ), then implies that ∆s(σ) → 0 as s → ˜ r. Together with the fact that
θ∗
s(σ) is increasing in s and hence that Ds′(σ) ⊃ Ds(σ) for any s′ > s, this completes the proof of
part (iii). Q.E.D.
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s (σ)}dF(s) if r ∈ (r, ˜ r]
0 if r > ˜ r
∆(r;F,σ) =

   
   
∞ if r = r
 
s∈[r,˜ r] ∆s(σ)dF (s) if r ∈ (r, ˜ r]
0 if r > ˜ r
Consider ﬁrst part (i). For r > ˜ r, P(r,θ;F,σ) = 0 follows directly from part (i) in Proposition
2. For r ∈ (r, ˜ r], it suﬃces to let θ◦ = θ∗
r(σ) and θ◦◦ = max{θ∗∗
s (σ) : s ∈ [r, ˜ r]}, Note that, for any
r ∈ (r, ˜ r], θ∗∗
s (σ) is continuous over s ∈ [r, ˜ r], ensuring that the maximum exists.
28Part (ii) follows directly from part (ii) in Proposition 2.
Part (iii) follows from these properties: ∆s(σ) is strictly decreasing in s, for any s ∈ (r, ˜ r);
Ds(θ;σ) is nondecreasing in s, for any s ∈ (r, ˜ r); for any θ ∈ (θ, ˜ θ), D(θ;F′,σ) = 1−F′(C−1(V (θ,0)) >
1 − F(C−1(V (θ,0)) = D(θ;F,σ).
Finally, consider part (iv). That ∆(r,F,σ′) ≥ ∆(r,F,σ) for all r ∈ (r, ˜ r), with strict inequality
unless ∆(r,F,σ) = 0 (i.e., unless F assigns all measure to s ∈ {r, ˜ r}), follows from the fact that
∆s(σ) is positive and strictly decreasing in σ for all s ∈ (r, ˜ r). That limσ→0 ∆(r,F,σ) = 0 then
follows from Lebesgue monotone convergence theorem using the fact that limσ→0 ∆s(σ) = 0 for any
s ∈ (r, ˜ r]. Finally, that D(θ;F,σ′) = D(θ;F,σ) follows from the fact that Ds(θ;σ) is independent
of σ for any s ∈ [r, ˜ r]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 That D, ¯ D, and P are independent of σ is immediate. Thus consider
¯ P. Because for any s ∈ (r, ˜ r], θ∗
s(σ) is independent of σ, whereas θ∗∗
s (σ) = θ∗
s(σ)+∆s (σ) is strictly

















is weakly increasing in σ. By the envelope theorem, ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) is thus also weakly increasing in





























where the last inequality follows from the fact that ∆s (σ) is decreasing in s for all s ∈ (r, ˜ r]. By
implication, ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) ≤ 1
θ2−θ1∆r (σ). That limσ→0 ¯ P(r,θ1,θ2;σ) = 0 then follows from the fact
that limσ→0 ∆r (σ) = 0. Q.E.D.
29Proof of Proposition 5. All results follow from the arguments in the main text, once the
following claim is proved.
Claim 1. For σ small enough, there exists rH(σ) < ˜ r, with rH(σ) → r as σ → 0, such that
x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x only if s < rH(σ).
Equivalently: there exists a θH(σ) < ˜ θ with θH(σ) → θ as σ → 0, such that x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x only if
θ∗
s(σ) < θH(σ).
Proof. For any θ∗
s(σ) ≤ ˜ θ, let θ∗∗ (θ∗) be the unique solution to G(θ∗,θ∗∗) = 0, where G(θ∗,θ)
is the function deﬁned in (11), and let x∗ (θ∗) ≡ X (θ∗,θ∗∗ (θ∗)). From (8),







with B (θ∗,θ) deﬁned as in (16). Hence,







where B∗ (θ∗) ≡ B (θ∗,θ∗∗ (θ∗)). Using again (8) and (16), B∗ (θ∗) = ˆ B(∆(θ∗)), where ˆ B(∆) is the













and ∆(θ∗) ≡ θ∗∗(θ∗) − θ∗ is the continuous function implicitly deﬁned by ˆ G(θ∗,∆) = 0, with
ˆ G(θ∗,∆) ≡ V (θ∗ + ∆,0) − V (θ∗,0) − V
 
θ∗ + ∆, ˆ B (∆)
 
.
Because ∆(θ∗) is decreasing in θ∗ (from Proposition 2), B∗ is increasing in θ∗. Moreover, B∗ → 0
as θ∗ → θ and B∗ → 1 − r as θ∗ → ˜ θ. It follows that
x∗ → +∞ as θ∗ → θ and x∗ = ˜ x when θ∗ = ˜ θ,
where ˜ x = ˜ θ + σΨ−1 [1 − r].
Now note that
dx∗















Pick any δ1 ∈ (0,1) and any θ1 ∈ (θ, ˜ θ). Because for any θ∗ ∈ [θ1, ˜ θ), dB∗(θ∗)/dθ∗ is bounded away
from inﬁnity, there exists σ1 > 0 such that, whenever σ < σ1, dx∗/dθ∗ > δ1 for all θ∗ ∈ [θ1, ˜ θ).
30Together with the fact that x∗ = ˜ x at θ∗ = ˜ θ, this implies that x∗ < ˜ x for all θ∗ ∈ [θ1, ˜ θ). Hence,
for any σ < σ1, there exists a θH(σ) ≤ θ1 < ˜ θ such that x∗
s(σ) > ˜ x only if θ∗
s(σ) < θH(σ).
Furthermore, because the argument above holds for any θ1 ∈ (θ, ˜ θ), this implies that θH(σ) can be
made arbitrarily close to θ by taking σ small enough. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. For θ < θ, it is dominant for the policy maker to set r and abandon the
peg and for private speculators to attack. Similarly, for θ > θ, the peg is never abandoned, private
speculators do not attack, and there is no need to undertake any costly policy measure. Finally,
take any θ ∈ [θ,θ]. The continuation game following any level of the policy r is a coordination game
with two (extreme) continuation equilibria, no attack and full attack. Let r(θ) be the minimal r
for which private speculators coordinate on the no-attack continuation equilibrium, i.e. they attack
if and only if r < r(θ). Clearly, it is optimal for the policy maker to set r(θ) > r if and only if
V (θ,0) − C(r(θ)) ≥ 0, or equivalently r ≤ ρ(θ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. The characterization of G(0) follows directly from Proposition 7.
Thus consider G(σ) for σ > 0. Note that
G(σ) = {(θ,r) : either r = r and θ ∈ R, or r ∈ (r, ˜ r] and θ∗
r (σ) ≤ θ ≤ θ∗∗
r (σ)}.
For all r ∈ (r, ˜ r] and all σ > 0, θ∗∗
r (σ) is continuous in r and also continuous and nondecreasing in
σ (strictly increasing when r < ˜ r), with limσ→0 θ∗∗
r (σ) = θ∗
r (σ) = ρ−1 (r). It follows that, for any
ε > 0, there exists ¯ σ > 0 such that, for all σ ∈ (0, ¯ σ) and all r ∈ [r+ε, ˜ r], θ∗∗
r (σ) < ρ−1 (r)+ε. But
then, for all σ ∈ (0, ¯ σ),
G(σ) ⊂ {(θ,r) : either r ∈ [r,r + ε] and θ ∈ R, or r ∈ [r + ε, ˜ r] and θ ∈ [ρ−1(r),ρ−1 (r) + ε]}.
Together with the fact that, for all σ > 0,
G(σ) ⊃ {(θ,r) : either r = r and θ ∈ R, or r ∈ (r, ˜ r] and θ = ρ−1(r)},
this establishes the result.
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